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Abstract
I propose a framework for an agent to change its proba-
bilistic beliefs when a new piece of propositional infor-
mation α is observed. Traditionally, belief change oc-
curs by either a revision process or by an update pro-
cess, depending on whether the agent is informed with
α in a static world or, respectively, whether α is a ‘sig-
nal’ from the environment due to an event occurring.
Boutilier suggested a unified model of qualitative belief
change, which “combines aspects of revision and up-
date, providing a more realistic characterization of be-
lief change.” In this paper, I propose a unified model
of quantitative belief change, where an agent’s beliefs
are represented as a probability distribution over possi-
ble worlds. As does Boutilier, I take a dynamical sys-
tems perspective. The proposed approach is evaluated
against several rationality postulated, and some proper-
ties of the approach are worked out.
Information acquired can be due to evolution of the world
or revelation about the world. That is, one may notice via
some ‘signal’ generated by the changing environment that
the environment has changed, or, one may be informed by
an independent agent in a static environment that some ‘fact’
holds.
In the present work, I deal with belief change of agents
who handle uncertainty by maintaining a probability distri-
bution over possible situations. The agents in this framework
also have models for nondeterministic events, and noisy ob-
servations. Noisy observation models can model imperfect
sensory equipment for receiving environmental signals, but
they can also model untrustworthy informants in a static
world.
In this paper, I provide the work of Boutilier (1998) as
background, because it has several connections with and was
the seed for the present work. However, I do not intend sim-
ply to give a probabilistic version of his Generalized Update
Semantics. Whereas Boutilier (1998) presents a model for
unifying qualitative belief revision and update, I build on his
work to present a unified model of belief revision and update
in a stochastic (probabilistic) setting. I also take a dynami-
cal systems perspective, like him. Due to my quantitative
approach, an agent can maintain a probability distribution
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over the worlds it believes possible, using an expectation se-
mantics of change. This is in contrast to Boutilier’s “gener-
alized update” approach, which takes a most-plausible event
and most-plausible world approach. Finally, my proposal re-
quires a trade-off factor to mix the changes in probability
distribution over possible worlds brought about due to the
probabilistic belief revision process and, respectively, the
probabilistic belief update process. Boutilier’s model has re-
vision and update more tightly coupled. For this reason, his
approach is better called “unified” while mine is called “hy-
brid”.
The belief change community does not study probabilistic
belief update; it is studied almost exclusively in frameworks
employing Bayesian conditioning – for modeling events
and actions in dynamical domains (e.g., DBNs, MDPs,
POMDPs) (Koller and Friedman, 2009; Poole and Mack-
worth, 2010, e.g.). The part of my approach responsible for
updating stays within the Bayesian framework, but com-
bines the essential elements of belief update with unobserv-
able events and belief update as partially observable Markov
decision process (POMDP) state estimation.
On the other hand, there is plenty of literature on proba-
bilistic belief revision (Voorbraak, 1999; Grove and Halpern,
1998; Kern-Isberner, 2008; Yue and Liu, 2008, e.g.). The
subject is both deep and broad. There is no one accepted ap-
proach and to argue which is the best is not the focus of this
paper. I shall choose one reasonable method for probabilistic
belief revision suitable to the task at hand.
In the first section, Boutilier’s ‘generalized update’ is
reviewed. Then, in the next section, I introduce stochas-
tic update and stochastic revision, culminating in the ‘hy-
brid stochastic belief change’ (HSBC) approach. The final
section presents an example inspired by Boutilier’s article
(1998) and analyses the results.
Some proofs of propositions are omitted to save space;
they are available on request.
Boutilier’s Generalized Update
I use Boutilier’s notation and descriptions, except that I am
more comfortable with α and β to represent sentences, in-
stead of A and B. It is assumed that an agent has a deduc-
tively closed belief set K, a set of sentences drawn from
some logical language reflecting the agent’s beliefs about the
current state of the world. For ease of presentation, I assume
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a logically finite, classical propositional language, denoted
L (LCPL in Boutilier (1998)), and consequence operation
Cn . The belief set K will often be generated by some finite
knowledge base KB (i.e., K = Cn(KB)). The identically
true and false propositions are denoted > and ⊥, respec-
tively. Given a set of possible worlds W (or valuations over
L) and α ∈ L, the set of α-worlds, that is, the elements of
W satisfying α, is denoted by ||α||. The worlds satisfying
all sentences in a set K is denoted ||K||.
Update
Given a belief set K, an agent will often observe a change
in the world α, requiring the agent to change K. This is the
update of K by α, denoted Kα.
“||KB || represents the set of possibilities we are prepared
to accept as the actual state of affairs. Since observation α
is the result of some change in the actual world, we ought to
consider, for each possibilityw ∈ ||KB ||, the most plausible
way (or ways) in which w might have changed in order to
make α true. That is, we want to consider the most plausible
evolution of world w into a world satisfying the observation
α. To capture this intuition, Katsuno and Mendelzon (1991)
propose a family of preorders {≤w| w ∈ W}, where each
≤w is a reflexive, transitive relation over W . We interpret
each such relation as follows: if u ≤w v then u is at least as
plausible a change relative to w as is v; that is, situation w
would more readily evolve into u than it would into v.
Finally, a faithfulness condition is imposed: for every
world w, the preorder ≤w has w as a minimum element;
that is, w <w v for all v 6= w. Naturally, the most plausi-
ble candidate changes in w that result in α are those worlds
v satisfying α that are minimal in the relation ≤w. The set
of such minimal α-worlds for each relation ≤w, and each
w ∈ ||KB ||, intuitively capture the situations we ought to
accept as possible when updating KB with α,” (Boutilier,
1998, p. 9). In other words,
||KB  α|| =
⋃
w∈||KB||
{Min(α,≤w)},
where Min(α,≤w) specifies the minimal α-worlds with re-
spect to the preorder ≤w. Then Kα = Cn(KB  α), where
K is the belief set associated with KB .
Revision
Given a belief set K, an agent will often obtain information
α in a static world, which must be incorporated into K. This
is the revision of K by α, denoted K∗α.
The AGM theory of belief revision (Alchourro´n,
Ga¨rdenfors, and Makinson, 1985) provides a set of guide-
lines, in the form of the postulates, governing the pro-
cess. “Unfortunately, while the postulates constrain possi-
ble revisions, they do not dictate the precise beliefs that
should be retracted when α is observed. An alternative
model of revision, based on the notion of epistemic en-
trenchment (Ga¨rdenfors, 1988), has a more constructive na-
ture,” (Boutilier, 1998, p. 6).
“Semantically, an entrenchment relation (hence a revi-
sion function) can be modeled using an ordering on possi-
ble worlds reflecting their relative plausibility (Grove, 1988;
Boutilier, 1994). However, rather than use a qualitative rank-
ing relation, we adopt the presentation of (Spohn, 1988;
Goldszmidt and Pearl, 1992) and rank all possible worlds us-
ing a κ-ranking. Such a ranking κ : W → N assigns to each
world a natural number reflecting its plausibility or degree
of believability. If κ(w) < κ(v) then w is more plausible
than v or more consistent with the agent’s beliefs. We insist
that κ−1(0) 6= ∅, so that maximally plausible worlds are as-
signed rank 0. These maximally plausible worlds are exactly
those consistent with the agent’s beliefs; that is, the epis-
temically possible worlds according to K are those deemed
most plausible in κ (see Spohn (1988) for further details).
We sometimes assume κ is a partial function, and loosely
write κ(w) = ∞ to mean κ(w) is not defined (i.e., w is not
in the domain of κ, or w is impossible),” (Boutilier, 1998,
p. 6).
A κ-ranking captures the entrenchment of the agent’s be-
liefs in its belief set K. This entrenchment determines how
K will be revised when the agent receives new information
/ makes an observation α. κ induces a belief set as follows.
K = {α ∈ L | κ−1(0) ⊆ ||α||}.
Due to the ranking or entrenchment of knowledge provided
by κ, κ is considered an epistemic state.
“In other words, the set of most plausible worlds (those
such that κ(w) = 0) determine the agent’s beliefs. The rank-
ing κ also induces a revision function: to revise by α an
agent adopts the most plausible α-worlds as epistemically
possible,” (Boutilier, 1998, p. 6).
Let Wi = {w ∈ W | κ(w) = i}. And let Min(α, κ) be
the setWi with the least i such that for allwi ∈Wi,wi |= α.
Then
K∗α := {β ∈ L | Min(α, κ) ⊆ ||β||}.
In words, the belief set revised by α contains all those sen-
tences entailed by the set of worlds with the same rank,
where that rank is the least such that they are all α-worlds.
Generalized Update
As explained in the introduction, my intention with this pa-
per is not to give a probabilistic version of the Generalized
Update approach (Boutilier, 1998). For completeness, how-
ever, I sketch the approach here covering the approach in de-
tail would take up unnecessary space without lending much
insight into my Hybrid Stochastic Belief Change approach.
Boutilier motivates the need for a generalized update
method which includes revision, by claiming that KM up-
date (Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1991) is insufficient. He pro-
vides the following example adopted from Moore (1990).
Suppose you want to test whether the contents of a beaker
are chemically acid or base. If it is acid, a piece of litmus pa-
per will turn red, if base, the paper will turn blue. Suppose
that the test has not yet been performed, but you believe that
the contents in the beaker are acidic. When the litmus paper
is dipped into and pulled out of the beaker, the paper turns
blue, indicating a basic compound. “Unfortunately, the KM
theory does not allow this to take place. [...] One is forced
to accept that, if the contents were acidic (in which case it
should turn red), some extraordinary change occurred (the
test failed, the contents of the beaker were switched, etc.).
[...] Of course, the right thing to do is simply admit that the
beaker did not, in fact, contain an acid—the agent should re-
vise its beliefs about the contents of the beaker,” (Boutilier,
1998, p. 13).
Boutilier adopts an event-based approach where a set of
events E is assumed. These events are allowed to be nonde-
terministic, and each possible outcome of an event is ranked
according to its plausibility via a κ-ranking. “As in the orig-
inal event-based semantics, we will assume each world has
an event ordering associated with it that describes the plausi-
bility of various event occurrences at that world,” (Boutilier,
1998, p. 14).
A generalized update model is then defined as
〈W,κ,E, µ〉, where W is a set of worlds (the agent’s epis-
temic state), κ is a ranking overW ,E is a set of events (map-
pings overW ), and µ is an event ordering (a set of mappings
over E).
As with KM update, updates usually occur in response to
some observation, with the assumption that something oc-
curred to cause this observation. After observing α, an agent
should adjust its beliefs by considering that only the most
plausible transitions leading to α actually occurred. The set
of possible α-transitions are those transitions leading to α-
worlds. The most plausible α-transitions are those possible
α-transitions with the minimal κ-ranking. Given that α has
actually been observed, an agent should assume that one of
these transitions describes the actual course of events. The
worlds judged to be epistemically possible are those that re-
sult from the most plausible of these transitions.
Boutilier (1998) has a proposition that states that gen-
eralized belief update as described above is equivalent to
“first determining the predicted updated ranking κ fol-
lowed by standard (AGM) revision by α with respect to
κ,” (Boutilier, 1998, p. 16). κ is determined by taking the
worlds in the current possible worlds ||K|| (induced from
κ) and shifting them to all possible worlds given all possi-
ble transitions given all possible events (the actual event is
unknown), taking into account the relevant plausibility rank-
ings.
Stochastic Belief Change
I now consider agents who deal with uncertainty by main-
taining a probability distribution over possible situations
(worlds) they could be in. Let a belief state b be defined as
the set {(w, p) | w ∈W,p ∈ [0, 1]}, where∑(w,p)∈b p = 1.
The probability of being in w is denoted b(w). That is, b is a
probability distribution over all the worlds in W . In the hy-
brid stochastic belief change (HSBC) framework, an agent
maintains a belief state, which changes as new information
is received or observed.
An agent is assumed to have a model of how the world
works.
Definition 1. The stochastic belief change modelM has the
form 〈W, ε, T,E,O, os〉, where
• W is a set of possible worlds,
• ε is a set of events,
• T : (W × ε ×W ) → [0, 1] is a transition function such
that for every e ∈ ε and w ∈ W , ∑w′∈W T (w, e, w′) =
1 (T (w, e, w′) models the probability of a transition to
world w′, given the occurrence of event e in world w),
• E is the event likelihood function (E(e, w) = P (e | w),
the probability of the occurrence of event e in w),
• O : (L×W )→ [0, 1] is an observation function such that
for every world w,
∑
α∈ΩO(α,w) = 1 (O(α,w) models
the probability of observing α in w), where Ω ⊂ L is the
set of possible observations, up to equivalence, and where
if α ≡ β, then O(α,w) = O(β,w), for all worlds w.1
• os : (Ω × W ) → [0, 1] (os(α,w) is the agent’s ontic
strength for α perceived in w.)
Definition 2. b(α) :=
∑
w∈W,w|=α b(w).
Let b◦α := b ◦ α so that we can write b◦α(w), where ◦ is
any update or revision operator.
Often, in the exposition of this paper, a world will be re-
ferred to by its truth vector. For instance, if the vocabulary is
{q, r} and w3 |= ¬q ∧ r, then w3 may be referred to as 01.
For parsimony, let b = 〈p1, . . . , pn〉 be the proba-
bilities that belief state b assigns to w1, . . . , wn where
〈w1, w2, w3, w4〉 = 〈11, 10, 01, 00〉, and 〈w1, w2, . . . , w8〉
= 〈111, 110, . . . , 000〉.
Update
Transitions associated with the observation of α from a
world w in the current belief state bcur to a world w′ could
be caused by different events. According to Boutilier (1998),
update can be defined as
beventnew :=
{
(w′, p′) | w′ ∈W,p′ =∑
w∈W
∑
e∈ε
T (w, e, w′)E(e, w)bcur (w)
}
.
Because the actual event is unobservable/hidden, p′ is the
expected probability of reaching w′, given the event proba-
bilities.
In partially observable Markov decision process
(POMDP) theory (Astro¨m, 1965; Monahan, 1982; Lovejoy,
1991), events are actions chosen by the agent (and thus
observable) and observations are hidden. Then, given
current belief state bcur , selected action a and observation
o, the state estimation function is defined by
bpomdpnew :=
{
(w′, p′) | w′ ∈W,p′ =
O(o, a, w′)
∑
w∈W T (w, a,w
′)bcur (w)
P (o | a, bcur )
}
,
where Ω is a set of observation objects and O : (Ω × A ×
W ) → [0, 1] is an observation function, such that for every
a and w′,
∑
o∈ΩO(o, a, w
′) = 1. O(o, a, w′) models the
probability of perceiving o in arrival world w′, given the ex-
ecution of some action a ∈ A. Note that P (o | a, bcur ) is a
normalizing constant.
1≡ denotes logical equivalence.
But what is the probabilistic update, given new informa-
tion/evidence α? I suggest that α is the (overt) ‘signal’ gen-
erated by the (covert) event. An important question is, When
is α received – in the current/departure world (wc) or in the
new/arrival world (wn)? Although it is not clear to me, in
POMDP theory, observations are always assumed to be re-
ceived in the arrival world – I shall assume the same.
In the present framework, actions are not selected by the
agent, but by nature. In other words, actions are considered
to be events occurring in the environment, uncontrollable by
the agent. Further, at the present stage of research, I shall
assume that the agent has a less detailed observation model,
that is, an agent only knows O(α,wn), the probability of
perceiving α in arrival world wn (defined in Def. 1). Hence,
I propose to weight beventnew (w
′) by O(α,wn) when receiv-
ing new information α and one knows that one’s belief state
should be updated (due to an evolving world). Then we can
define
Definition 3.
b  α :={(w′, p′) | w′ ∈W,p′ =
1
γ
O(α,w′)
∑
w∈W
∑
e∈ε
T (w, e, w′)E(e, w)b(w)
}
,
where γ is a normalizing factor.
As far as I know, no-one has proposed rationality pos-
tulates for probabilistic update. The reason is likely due to
probabilistic update being defined in terms of standard prob-
ability theory. The axioms of probability theory have been
argued to be rational for several decades (although it is not
without its detractors).
The following basic postulates for my probabilistic belief
update are proposed. (Unless stated otherwise, it is assumed
that α is logically satisfiable, i.e., ` ¬α is false.)
(P 1) bα is a belief state iff not ` ¬α
(P 2) bα(α) = 1
(P 3) If α ≡ β, then bα = bβ
Proposition 1. If bα(α) > 0, it is not necessary that
bα(α) = 1.
Proof. Let the vocabulary be {q, r}. Let b =
〈0.4, 0, 0.1, 0.5〉. Let there be only one event e. Let
the transition function be specified as T (11, e, 11) = 0.5,
T (11, e, 10) = 0.5, T (10, e, 01) = 1, T (01, e, 00) = 1,
T (00, e, 11) = 1. Let E(e, w) = 1 for all w ∈ W . Let
the evidence be q. Let O(q, 11) = 0.2, O(q, 10) = 0,
O(q, 01) = 0, O(q, 00) = 0.3. Then applying oper-
ation  to b produces bq = 〈0.82, 0, 0, 0.18〉. Hence,
bq(q) = 0.82 6= 1.
Although the following proposition is mostly negative,
the reader will soon see that constraining the stochastic be-
lief change model to be ‘rational’, the negative postulates
become positive.
Proposition 2. Postulate (P 3) holds, while (P 1) and
(P 2) do not hold.
Definition 4. We say event e is event-rational when for all
w ∈ W : there exists a w′ such that T (w, e, w′) > 0 iff
E(e, w) > 0.
Definition 5. We say α is an e-signal when for all w′ ∈W :
there exists a w such that T (w, e, w′) > 0 iff O(α,w′) > 0.
Definition 6. We say a model M is observation-rational iff
for all α, whenever ` ¬α, O(α,w) = 0 for all w ∈W .
The proposition below says that if one is rational w.r.t. ob-
servations and w.r.t. some event, and α is a signal produced
by that event, then updating on α is defined.
Proposition 3. If M is observation-rational, there exists an
event e ∈ ε which is event-rational and α is an e-signal,
then bα is a belief state iff not ` ¬α (i.e., then (P 1) holds).
(P 2) does not hold under the antecedents of Proposi-
tion 3. Another definition is required as qualification:
Definition 7. We say evidence α is trustworthy iff for all
w ∈W , if w 6|= α, then O(α,w) = 0.
The proposition below says that if α is trustworthy, one is
rational w.r.t. some event, and α is a signal produced by that
event, then one should accept α in the updated belief state.
Proposition 4. If α is trustworthy, there exists an event e ∈
ε which is event-rational and α is an e-signal, then bα(α) =
1 (i.e., then (P 2) holds).
Proof. Not ` ¬α is assumed by default. Recall that
bα(α) =
∑
w∈W,w|=α b

α(w). Referring to the (⇐) part of
the proof of Proposition 3, bα(α) is a belief state and thus∑
w∈W b

α(w) = 1. Hence, for b

α(α) to be less than 1, there
must exist a w′ ∈ W s.t. w′ 6|= α and bα(w′) > 0. But then
O(α,w′) > 0. Therefore, for (P 2) not to hold, an agent
needs to believe thatO(α,w′) > 0 for some world w′ where
w′ 6|= α. But then α cannot be trustworthy (i.e., then (P 2)
holds.
Definition 8 (Ga¨rdenfors, 1988). A probabilistic belief
change operation ◦ is said to be preservative iff for all belief
states P and for all propositions α and β, if P (α) > 0 and
P (β) = 1, then P ◦α(β) = 1.
Proposition 5. Operation  is not preservative.
Definition 9. We say evidence α is β-trustworthy if for all
w ∈W , if w 6|= β, then O(α,w) = 0.
Proposition 6. If bα(β) is a belief state, b(β) = 1 and α is
β-trustworthy, then bα(β) = 1.
Proof.
∑
w∈W b

α(w) = 1. Hence, for b

α(β) to be < 1,
there must exist a w× ∈ W s.t. w× 6|= β and bα(w×) > 0.
And because b(β) = 1, b(w×) = 0. So some probability
mass must have been shifted from some β-world to the non-
β-world w×.
By definition, bα(w
×) = 1γ O(α,w
×)∑
w∈W
∑
e∈ε T (w, e, w
×)E(e, w)b(w). So for bα(w
×) to
be > 0, O(α,w×) must be > 0.
However, because α is β-trustworthy, O(α,w×) = 0.
Hence, O(α,w×) 6> 0 and bα(β) 6< 1.
Proposition 7. bα∧β 6= (bα)β .
Proof. For instance, consider the example used in the proof
of Proposition 1. Let α be q and let β be q ∧ r. Note that
α∧β is then logically equivalent to q∧r. LetO(q∧r, 11) =
O(q ∧ r, 10) = 0.5 and O(q ∧ r, 01) = O(q ∧ r, 00) = 0.
We know that bq = 〈0.82, 0, 0, 0.18〉. Then (bq)q∧r =
〈1, 0, 0, 0〉. On the other hand, bq∧r = 〈0.875, 0, 0, 0.125〉.
Revision
Using Bayes’ Rule2 , P (wn | α) can be determined:
P (w | α) := O(α,w)b(w)∑
w′∈W O(α,w′)b(w′)
.
Note that if O(α,w) = 0, then P (w | α) = 0.
It is not yet universally agreed what revision means in a
probabilistic setting. In classical belief change, it is under-
stood that if the new information α is consistent with the
agent’s current beliefs KB , then revision is equivalent to be-
lief expansion (denoted +), where expansion is the logical
consequences of KB ∪ {α}. It is mostly agreed upon that
Bayesian conditioning corresponds to classical belief expan-
sion. This is evidenced by Bayesian conditioning (BC) being
defined only when b(α) 6= 0. In other words, one could de-
fine revision to be
b BC α := {(w, p) | w ∈W,p = P (w | α)},
as long as P (α) 6= 0.3
To accommodate cases where b(α) 6= 0, that is, where α
contradicts the agent’s current beliefs and its beliefs need to
be revised in the stronger sense, we shall make use of imag-
ing. Imaging was introduced by Lewis (1976) as a means of
revising a probability function. It has also been discussed
in the work of, for instance, Ga¨rdenfors (1988); Dubois
and Prade (1993); Chhogyal et al. (2014); Rens and Meyer
(2015). The following version of imaging must not be re-
garded as a fundamental part of the larger belief change
framework presented here; it should be regarded as a place-
holder or suggestion for the ‘revision-module’ of the frame-
work. Informally, Lewis’s original solution for accommo-
dating contradicting evidence α is to move the probability
of each world to its closest, α-world. Lewis made the strong
assumption that every world has a unique closest α-world.
More general versions of imaging allow worlds to have sev-
eral, equally proximate, closest worlds.
Ga¨rdenfors (1988) calls one of his generalizations of
Lewis’s imaging general imaging. Our method is also a gen-
eralization. We thus refer to his as Ga¨rdenfors’s general
imaging and to our method as generalized imaging to dis-
tinguish them. It should be noted that these imaging meth-
ods are general revision methods and can be used in place
of Bayesian conditioning for expansion. “Thus imaging is a
more general method of describing belief changes than con-
ditionalization,” (Ga¨rdenfors, 1988, p. 112).
2Bayes’ Rule states (in the notation of this paper) that P (w |
α) = P (α | w)P (w)/P (α) or P (w | α) = P (α |
w)P (w)/
∑
w′∈W P (α | w′)P (w′).
3Note that in my notation, b(α) is equivalent to P (α).
Let Min(α,w, d) be the set of α-worlds closest to w mea-
sured with d. Formally,
Min(α,w, d) :=
{w′ ∈ ||α|| | ∀w′′ ∈ ||α||, d(w′, w) ≤ d(w′′, w)},
where d(·) is some acceptable measure of distance between
worlds (e.g., Hamming or Dalal distance). It must also obey
the faithfulness condition that for every world w, d(w,w) <
d(v, w) for all v 6= w.
Example 1. Let the vocabulary be {q, r, s}. Let α be (q ∧
r) ∨ (q ∧ ¬r ∧ s). Suppose d is Hamming distance. Then
Min((q ∧ r) ∨ (q ∧ ¬r ∧ s), 111, d) = {111}
Min((q ∧ r) ∨ (q ∧ ¬r ∧ s), 110, d) = {110}
Min((q ∧ r) ∨ (q ∧ ¬r ∧ s), 101, d) = {101}
Min((q ∧ r) ∨ (q ∧ ¬r ∧ s), 100, d) = {110, 101}
Min((q ∧ r) ∨ (q ∧ ¬r ∧ s), 011, d) = {111}
Min((q ∧ r) ∨ (q ∧ ¬r ∧ s), 010, d) = {110}
Min((q ∧ r) ∨ (q ∧ ¬r ∧ s), 001, d) = {101}
Min((q ∧ r) ∨ (q ∧ ¬r ∧ s), 000, d) = {110, 101}
Then generalized imaging (denoted GI) is defined as
Definition 10.
b GI α :=
{
(w, p) | w ∈W,p = 0 if w 6∈ ||α||,
else p =
∑
w′∈W
w∈Min(α,w′,d)
b(w′)/|Min(α,w′, d)|}.
Example 2. Continuing on Example 1: Let b =
〈0, 0.1, 0, 0.2, 0, 0.3, 0, 0.4〉.
(q ∧ r) ∨ (q ∧ ¬r ∧ s) is abbreviated as α.
bGIα (111) =
∑
w′∈W
111∈Min(α,w′,d)
b(w′)/|Min(α,w′, d)|
= b(111)/|Min(α, 111, d)| + b(011)/|Min(α, 011, d)| =
0/1 + 0/1 = 0.
bGIα (110) =
∑
w′∈W
110∈Min(α,w′,d)
b(w′)/|Min(α,w′, d)|
= b(110)/|Min(α, 110, d)| + b(100)/|Min(α, 100, d)| +
b(010)/|Min(α, 010, d)| + b(000)/|Min(α, 000, d)| =
0.1/1 + 0.2/2 + 0.3/1 + 0.4/2 = 0.7.
bGIα (101) =
∑
w′∈W
101∈Min(α,w′,d)
b(w′)/|Min(α,w′, d)|
= b(101)/|Min(α, 101, d)| + b(100)/|Min(α, 100, d)| +
b(001)/|Min(α, 001, d)| + b(000)/|Min(α, 000, d)| =
0/1 + 0.2/2 + 0/1 + 0.4/2 = 0.3.
And bGIα (100) = b
GI
α (011) = b
GI
α (010) = b
GI
α (001) =
bGIα (000) = 0.
Notice how the probability mass of non-α-worlds is
shifted to their closest α-worlds. If a non-α-world w× with
probability p has n closest α-worlds (equally distant), then
each of these closest α-worlds gets p/n mass from w×.
Recall that in the proposed framework, agents have ac-
cess to an observation model (formalized via an observa-
tion function O(·, ·)). Given enough computational power
and time, it would be irrational for an agent to ignore its ob-
servation model when revising its beliefs. Another proposed
definition for a stochastic belief revision operation based on
imaging (denoted OGI) is thus
Definition 11.
b OGI α :=
{
(w, p) | w ∈W,p = O(α,w)b
GI
α (w)∑
w′∈W O(α,w′)bGIα (w′)
}
,
where the denominator is a normalizing factor.
b OGI α is not defined as{
(w, p) | w ∈W,p = 0 if w 6∈ ||α||,
else p =
∑
w′∈W
w∈Min(α,w′,d)
O(α,w′)b(w′)/|Min(α,w′, d)|
}
,
because α is assumed perceived in the new world w, not the
old world w′.
Note that if P (· | α) were used instead of O(α, ·), then
OGI would be undefined whenever b(α) = 0. But this is
exactly the problem we want to avoid by using imaging. An-
other justification to rather use O(α,w) is that its value is
positively correlated with P (w | α): If O(α,w) = 0, then
P (w | α) = 0. If P (w | α) = 1, then O(α,w) is maximal
in b in the following sense: for all w′ ∈ W , if w′ 6= w, then
either b(w′) = 0 or O(α,w′) = 0, whereas b(w) > 0 and
O(α,w) > 0.
Note that the denominator my be zero, making OGI un-
defined in that case. I shall deal with this issue a little bit
later.
Example 3. Recall from Example 2 that bGIα =〈0, 0.7, 0.3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0〉 and α is (q ∧ r) ∨ (q ∧ ¬r ∧ s). Let
O(α,w) = 0.3, say, for all w ∈ W . Then bOGIα = bGIα . Obvi-
ously, if the observation model carries no information with
respect to α, then it has no influence on the agent’s revised
beliefs.
Now let O(α,w) = 0.3 if w |= r, else O(α,w) =
0.2. Then bOGIα = 〈0.3 × 0/0.23, 0.2 × 0.7/0.23, 0.3 ×
0.3/0.23, 0.2 × 0/0.23, 0.3 × 0/0.23, 0.2 × 0/0.23, 0.3 ×
0/0.23, 0.2 × 0/0.23〉 = 〈0, 0.61, 0.39, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0〉. If the
agent has an observation model telling it that α is more
likely to be perceived in r-worlds than in ¬r-worlds, then
when it receives α, the agent should be biased to believing
that it is actually in an r-world. However, the agent was cer-
tain that it was in a ¬r-world when its belief state was b.
GI thus pushes the agent to favour the α-worlds being ¬r-
worlds. Hence, in this example there is tension between be-
ing in a ¬r-world (due to previous beliefs) and being in an
r-world (due to the observation model).
Definition 12.
b BCI α :=
{
b BC α if b(α) > 0
b OGI α if b(α) = 0
I denote the expansion of belief state b on α as b+α (resp.,
probability function P on α as P+α ) and delay its definition
till later. P⊥ is conventionally defined to be the absurd prob-
ability function which is defined to be P⊥(δ) = 1 for all
δ ∈ L.
Ga¨rdenfors (1988) proposed six rationality postulates for
probabilistic belief revision. (Unless stated otherwise, it is
assumed that α is logically satisfiable, i.e., ` ¬α is false.)
1. P ∗α is a probability function
2. P ∗α(α) = 1
3. If α ≡ β, then P ∗α = P ∗β
4. P ∗α 6= P⊥ iff not ` ¬α
5. If P (α) > 0, then P ∗α = P
+
α
6. If P ∗α(β) > 0, then P
∗
α∧β = (P
∗
α)
+
β .
Instead of saying that the result of an operation is P⊥, I
simply say that the result is undefined. And by noting that
the result of an operation is not a belief state if it is un-
defined, one can merge postulates 1 and 4. The stochastic
belief revision postulates in my notation are thus
(P ∗1) b∗α is a belief state iff not ` ¬α
(P ∗2) b∗α(α) = 1
(P ∗3) If α ≡ β, then b∗α = b∗β
(P ∗4) If b(α) > 0, then b∗α = b
+
α
(P ∗5) If b∗α(β) > 0, then b
∗
α∧β = (b
∗
α)
+
β .
I now test OGI and BCI against each of the five postulates.
Recall that if the denominator in the definition of OGI
is zero, it is undefined. To guarantee that OGI is defined,∑
w′∈W O(α,w
′)bGIα (w
′) must be non-zero, that is, there
must be at least one w′ ∈ W for which O(α,w′)bGIα (w′) >
0. We know that when w′ 6∈ ||α||, O(α,w′)bGIα (w′) =
bGIα (w
′) = 0.
Definition 13. We say α is weakly observable iff there exists
a w ∈ W such that w |= α and O(α,w) > 0. We say α is
strongly observable iff for all w ∈ W for which w |= α,
O(α,w) > 0.
Proposition 8. When ∗ is OGI, postulate (P ∗1), in general,
does not hold, but does hold if evidence α is strongly observ-
able.
Proof. Firstly, observe that b(w′) =∑
|Min(α,w′,d)| b(w
′)/|Min(α,w′, d)|. Therefore,
1 =
∑
w′∈w
b(w′)
=
∑
w′∈w
∑
|Min(α,w′,d)|
b(w′)/|Min(α,w′, d)|
=
∑
w′∈w,|Min(α,w′,d)|
b(w′)/|Min(α,w′, d)|
=
∑
w′∈w,w∈W,w∈Min(α,w′,d)
b(w′)/|Min(α,w′, d)|
=
∑
w∈W
∑
w′∈w,w∈Min(α,w′,d)
b(w′)/|Min(α,w′, d)|
=
∑
w∈W
bGIα (w).
Let b = 〈0, 0.1, 0, 0.2, 0, 0.3, 0, 0.4〉 and α be (q ∧ r) ∨
(q ∧ ¬r ∧ s). Let O(α, 111) = 0.9 and O(α,w) = 0 for
all w ∈ W , w 6= 111. (Notice that α is weakly observable.)
From Example 2, we know that bGIα (111) = 0, implying that
bOGIα (111) = 0, and one can deduce that b
OGI
α (w) = 0 for all
w ∈W , due to the specification of the observation model.
Now, let α be strongly observable: let O(α, 111) =
O(α, 110) = O(α, 101) = 0.1, else O(α, ·) = 0. Then
bOGIα = 〈0, 0.7, 0.3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0〉. In general, let O(α,w) > 0
for all w ∈ W for which w |= α. By definition of GI,
the probability mass of all non-α-worlds is shifted to their
closest α-worlds; the total mass (of the α-worlds) thus re-
mains 1. Hence, bGIα (α) = 1 and there exists a w
′ |= α
s.t. bGIα (w
′) > 0. Now, by definition of strong observability,
O(α,w′) > 0. Therefore, O(α,w′)bGIα (w
′) > 0. And due to
the normalizing effect of the denominator in the definition
of OGI, bOGIα is a belief state.
Proposition 9. When ∗ is OGI, postulate (P ∗2), in general,
does not hold and does hold when α is strongly observable.
Proof. This result follows directly from an understanding of
the proof of Proposition 8.
Proposition 10. When ∗ is OGI, postulate (P ∗3) holds.
Proposition 11. Let ∗ be OGI. If + is OGI, postulate (P ∗4)
holds, otherwise it does not.
Assuming (P ∗4) holds, I consider whether (P ∗5) holds
only for two combinations of instantiations of ∗ and +.
Proposition 12. When ∗ is OGI and + is OGI, postulate
(P ∗5) does not hold.
Proof. An instance is provided where bOGIα (β) > 0 and
bOGIα∧β 6= (bOGIα )OGIβ .
Continuing with Example 3, where b =
〈0, 0.1, 0, 0.2, 0, 0.3, 0, 0.4〉, α is (q ∧ r) ∨ (q ∧ ¬r ∧ s)
and bOGIα = b
GI
α = 〈0, 0.7, 0.3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0〉. Let
β be q ∧ r, then bOGIα (β) = 0.7 > 0. But
bOGIα∧β = b
OGI
β = 〈0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0〉 and (bOGIα )OGIβ =
〈0.3, 0.7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0〉.
Proposition 13. When ∗ is BCI, postulate (P ∗1) holds.
Proof. It is known that Bayesian conditioning results in a
belief state when the conditional is non-contradictory.
Proposition 14. When ∗ is BCI, postulate (P ∗2) holds.
Proof. By definition of BC, all non-α-worlds get zero prob-
ability and the probabilities of the remaining α-worlds are
magnified to sum to 1.
Proposition 15. When ∗ is BCI, postulate (P ∗3) holds.
Proposition 16. Let ∗ be BCI. If + is BC or BCI, postulate
(P ∗4) holds, otherwise it does not.
For the proof of the next proposition, a lemma is required.
Lemma 1. Let b(α) > 0. If bBCα (β) > 0, then b(α∧β) > 0.
Proof. Assume bBCα (β) > 0. Then there exists a w
β ∈ W
s.t. wβ |= β and bBCα (wβ) > 0. By definition, bBCα (w) =
b(α,w)
b(α) , implying
b(α,wβ)
b(α) > 0. Hence, b(w
β) > 0 and wβ |=
α. But if wβ |= α, then wβ |= α∧ β, and due to b(wβ) > 0,
b(α ∧ β) > 0.
Proposition 17. When ∗ is BCI and + is BC, postulate
(P ∗5), in general, does not hold, but does hold when b(α) >
0.
Recall that a probabilistic belief change operation ◦ is
preservative iff for all belief states b and for all propositions
α and β, if b(α) > 0 and b(β) = 1, then b◦α(β) = 1.
Proposition 18. Operation OGI is not preservative, while
BCI is preservative.
Proof. OGI: Let the vocabulary be {q, r} and b =
〈0, 0.5, 0.5, 0〉. Let α be q and β be q ↔ ¬r. Then b(α) > 0,
b(β) = 1 and bGIα = 〈0.5, 0.5, 0, 0〉. Let O(q, w) = 1 for all
w ∈W . Then bOGIα = 〈0.5, 0.5, 0, 0〉 and bOGIα (β) = 0.5.4
BCI: bBCIα (β) = b
BC
α (β). By assuming that b(α) > 0 and
b(β) = 1, one is implicitly assuming that if w |= α s.t.
b(α) > 0, then w |= β. This in turn implies that when-
ever bBCα (w) > 0, that w |= β. The latter is due to con-
ditionalization: {w ∈ W | bBCα (w) > 0} is a subset of{w ∈ W | w |= α, b(w) > 0}. By (P ∗2), bBCα (α) = 1.
But due to the fact that for all w ∈ W , if bBCα (w) > 0, then
w |= β, it must then be the case that bBCα (β) = 1.
Ontic and Epistemic Strength
Suppose there is a range of degrees for information being
ontic (the effect of a physical action or occurrence) or epis-
temic (purely informative). I shall assume that the higher the
information’s degree of being ontic, the lower the epistemic
status of that information. An agent has a certain sense of
the degree to which a piece of received information is due
to a physical action or event in the world. This sense may
come about due to a combination of sensor readings and rea-
soning. If the agent performs an action and a change in the
local environment matches the expected effect of the action,
it can be quite certain that the effect is ontic information. If
the agent receives the information from another agent (e.g.,
radio, through reading, a person speaking directly to the
agent), then it should be clear to the agent that the informa-
tion is epistemic and thus has a low degree of being ontic. If
the agent’s sensors show activity, but the agent knows that it
did not presently perform an action with an effect matching
its sensor readings, and if the readings do not reveal an epis-
temic source for the information, then the agent will have to
infer from the present world conditions and the information
received, or access learnt knowledge matching the present
world conditions and the information received, the degree to
which the information should be regarded as ontic. For in-
stance, a person might stop talking just after you ask him/her
to be quiet. Under particular conditions the person may stop
talking due to your request and in other conditions he/she
may have stopped talking anyway. Depending on the present
world conditions, you might assign a higher (but not defi-
nitely certainty) or lower (but not definitely zero) degree of
likelihood that the information (i.e., that the person stopped
talking) is ontic. Or suppose you have been wearing dark
glasses for one hour. You put them on due to the sky being
clear and (too) bright. When you take your glasses off, it is
not as bright as you thought it would be. So, has the ambient
4Here, d is Hamming distance.
brightness decreased due to changes in the weather, or does
it only seem darker when you remove your glasses, due to
some unknown physiological process? In this case, it would
be convenient to consider the brightness/darkness informa-
tion as being equally likely ontic and epistemic.
Recall from Definition 1 that os(α,w) indicates an
agent’s sense for the ontic strength of α received in w. We
say that os(α,w) = 1 when α is certainly ontic in w.
When α is certainly epistemic in w, then os(α,w) = 0.
In fact, let the epistemic strength of α in w be defined as
es(α,w) := 1− os(α,w).
Combining Update and Revision
I propose a way of trading off the probabilistic update and
probabilistic revision defined earlier, using the notion of on-
tic strength.
The hybrid stochastic change of belief state b due to new
information α with ontic strength (denoted bCα) is defined
as
Definition 14.
bC α :=
{
(w, p) | w ∈W,p =
1
γ
[
(1− os(α,w))b∗α(w) + os(α,w)bα(w)
]}
,
where γ is a normalizing factor so that
∑
w∈W b
C
α (w) = 1.
Due to our assumption that α is observed in the arrival
world, not the departure world, os(·) is applied to the arrival
world.
Considering the rationality postulates presented so far for
belief update and revision, one can naturally suggest the fol-
lowing postulates for their combination.
(PC1) bCα is a belief state iff not ` ¬α
(PC2) bCα (α) = 1
(PC3) If α ≡ β, then bCα = bCβ
Proposition 19. Postulate (PC1) does not hold.
Proposition 20. Postulate (PC2) does not hold.
Proof. (PC2) does not hold because (P 2) does not hold.
Proposition 21. Postulate (PC3) holds.
Proof. (PC3) is holds because (P 3) and (P ∗3) hold.
Theorem 1. If: the agent model M is observation-rational,
α is trustworthy and strongly observable, there exists an
event e ∈ ε which is event-rational and α is an e-signal,
then (i) bCα is a belief state iff not ` ¬α (i.e., then (PC1) is
true) and (ii) bCα (α) = 1 (i.e., then (P
C2) is true).
Proof. Note that by Propositions 3 and 4, (P 1) and (P 2)
hold. And recall that (P ∗1) and (P ∗2) are true when α is
strongly observable (see Props. 8, 9, 13 and 14).
(i)(PC1) Given the antecedents of this proposition, we
know by Proposition 4 that bα is defined iff not ` ¬α. And
by (P ∗4), b∗α is defined iff not ` ¬α.
(⇒) Assume bCα is defined. So there exists a w ∈
W s.t. bCα (w) > 0, that is,
1
γ
[
(1 − os(α,w))b∗α(w) +
os(α,w)bα(w)
]
> 0. Thus, either b∗α(w) > 0 (while
1 − os(α,w) > 0) or bα(w) > 0 (while os(α,w) > 0) (or
both), which implies that b∗α resp. b

α is defined. Therefore,
not ` ¬α.
(⇐) Assume not ` ¬α. Then b∗α and bα are defined. This
implied that there exists a w ∈ W s.t. either b∗α(w) > 0
or bα(w) > 0 (or both). Hence, b
C
α (w) > 0 and due to
normalization in the definition of C, bCα is defined.
(ii)(PC2) bCα (α) =
∑
w∈W,w|=α b
C
α (w) =∑
w∈W,w|=α
1
γ
[
(1 − os(α,w))b∗α(w) + os(α,w)bα(w)
]
,
where γ =
∑
w∈W
[
(1 − os(α,w))b∗α(w) +
os(α,w)bα(w)
]
. But by (P ∗2) and (P 2), if w 6|= α, then
b∗α(w) = 0 and b

α(w) = 0. Hence, γ =
∑
w∈W,w|=α
[
(1 −
os(α,w))b∗α(w) + os(α,w)b

α(w)
]
. Therefore, bCα (α) =∑
w∈W,w|=α
(1−os(α,w))b∗α(w)+os(α,w)bα(w)∑
w∈W,w|=α
[
(1−os(α,w))b∗α(w)+os(α,w)bα(w)
] =
1.
Although one cannot expect C to be preservative, due to
probabilistic update not being preservative (Prop. 5), one can
expect C to have preservative-like behaviour under particu-
lar conditions: Recall that α is defined to be β-trustworthy
if for all w ∈W , if w 6|= β, then O(α,w) = 0.
Proposition 22. If bα(β) is a belief state, bCα (β) is a be-
lief state, b(β) = 1, α is β-trustworthy and ∗ is BCI, then
bCα (β) = 1.
Proof. By Proposition 6, bα(β) = 1, when α is β-
trustworthy. By Proposition 18, ∗ is preservative when de-
fined as BCI. Then, for all w ∈ W , if w 6|= β, then
bα(β) = b
∗
α(β) = 0. Hence, for all w ∈ W , if w 6|= β,
bCα (w) = 0. Therefore, because b
C
α (β) is a belief state,
bCα (β) = 1− bCα (¬β)
= 1−
∑
w∈w,w|=¬β
bCα (w)
= 1−
∑
w∈w,w 6|=β
bCα (w)
= 1− 0
= 1.
Examples and Analysis
HSBC is now analyzed via examples. The example domain
is adapted from one of the domains in the article of Boutilier
(1998) – here though, worlds are associated with probabili-
ties, not plausibility ranks. There are eight possible worlds,
depending on whether a book B is inside the house (if it is
not in the house, then it is assumed to be on the patio, adja-
cent to the lawn), whether the book is dry and whether the
lawn-grass G is dry. There are three events: rain – it rains,
sprnk – the sprinkler is on, and null – neither of these, the
null event.5 In Boutilier’s example, events are deterministic;
however, events in this paper are modeled to be stochastic,
to better illustrate the behaviour of the framework.
To simplify calculations and to aid the reader in under-
standing the results, in the following examples, the agent
will associate equal epistemic/ontic strength to a particu-
lar piece of information for all worlds (per example case).
I shall compute the agent’s new belief state for each of
os(α,w) ∈ {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1} (for all w ∈ W ), for the
two cases where α is ¬Dry(G) and where α is ¬Dry(G) ∧
Dry(B).
Boutilier models the agent’s current (initial) epistemic
state with the most plausible situation (rank 0) being
(¬Inside(B), Dry(B), Dry(G)) and the next plausible
situation (rank 1) being (Inside(B), Dry(B), Dry(G)).
I translate this as the agent having a belief state
where b(¬Inside(B), Dry(B), Dry(G)) = 0.67 and
b(Inside(B), Dry(B), Dry(G)) = 0.33. Observe that in
these examples, revision as OGI is equivalent to revision as
BCI, because b(¬Dry(G)) = b(¬Dry(G) ∧ Dry(B)) = 0.
The HSBC model M = 〈W, ε, T,E,O, os〉 is now speci-
fied.
Let w1, . . . , w8 refer to worlds
w1: (Inside(B), Dry(B), Dry(G))
w2: (Inside(B), Dry(B),¬Dry(G))
w3: (Inside(B),¬Dry(B), Dry(G))
w4: (Inside(B),¬Dry(B),¬Dry(G))
w5: (¬Inside(B), Dry(B), Dry(G))
w6: (¬Inside(B), Dry(B),¬Dry(G))
w7: (¬Inside(B),¬Dry(B), Dry(G))
w8: (¬Inside(B),¬Dry(B),¬Dry(G))
The events are ε = {rain, sprnk, null}.
The following probabilities are debatable; they should not
be taken too seriously but serve to illustrate the framework.
T (w1, null, w1) = 0.75 T (w5, null, w5) = 1
T (w1, null, w2) = 0.1 T (w5, null, w6) = 0
T (w1, null, w3) = 0.1 T (w5, null, w7) = 0
T (w1, null, w4) = 0.05 T (w5, null, w8) = 0
T (w1, rain, w1) = 0 T (w5, rain, w5) = 0
T (w1, rain, w2) = 0.75 T (w5, rain, w6) = 0.05
T (w1, rain, w3) = 0 T (w5, rain, w7) = 0.05
T (w1, rain, w4) = 0.25 T (w5, rain, w8) = 0.9
T (w1, sprnk, w1) = 0 T (w5, sprnk, w5) = 0
T (w1, sprnk, w2) = 0.8 T (w5, sprnk, w6) = 0.8
T (w1, sprnk, w3) = 0 T (w5, sprnk, w7) = 0.05
T (w1, sprnk, w4) = 0.2 T (w5, sprnk, w8) = 0.15
E(null, w1) = 0.06 E(null, w5) = 0.15
E(rain, w1) = 0.31 E(rain, w5) = 0.7
E(sprnk, w1) = 0.63 E(sprnk, w5) = 0.15
5I shall assume that the null event may include some unknown
events (with unknown effects).
O(¬Dry(G), w1) = 0.05 O(¬Dry(G) ∧ Dry(B), w1) = 0.5
O(¬Dry(G), w2) = 0.95 O(¬Dry(G) ∧ Dry(B), w2) = 0.8
O(¬Dry(G), w3) = 0.05 O(¬Dry(G) ∧ Dry(B), w3) = 0.1
O(¬Dry(G), w4) = 0.95 O(¬Dry(G) ∧ Dry(B), w4) = 0.05
O(¬Dry(G), w5) = 0.05 O(¬Dry(G) ∧ Dry(B), w5) = 0.6
O(¬Dry(G), w6) = 0.95 O(¬Dry(G) ∧ Dry(B), w6) = 0.98
O(¬Dry(G), w7) = 0.05 O(¬Dry(G) ∧ Dry(B), w7) = 0.2
O(¬Dry(G), w8) = 0.95 O(¬Dry(G) ∧ Dry(B), w8) = 0.15
Recall that the current belief state is b =
〈0.33, 0, 0, 0, 0.67, 0, 0, 0〉. The following is a list of
resulting belief states b′ = b C ¬Dry(G) for the specified
ontic strengths.
os(·) bC ¬Dry(G)
0.00 〈0.00, 0.33, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.67, 0.00, 0.00〉
0.25 〈0.00, 0.32, 0.00, 0.02, 0.00, 0.53, 0.00, 0.13〉
0.50 〈0.00, 0.31, 0.00, 0.04, 0.00, 0.40, 0.00, 0.25〉
0.75 〈0.00, 0.30, 0.00, 0.06, 0.00, 0.26, 0.00, 0.38〉
1.00 〈0.00, 0.28, 0.00, 0.08, 0.01, 0.12, 0.00, 0.51〉
Several behaviours can be noted: When the observation is
completely epistemic, the probabilities of the two believed
worlds are each shifted to their closest ¬Dry(G)-worlds.
The more the agent considers the information to be ontic, the
more its beliefs are spread out due to the nondeterminism of
the events. Whether the observation is considered ontic or
epistemic, the agent has a relatively strong belief (between
28% and 33%) that the book is inside and dry. However,
in cases where the book is outside, there is a considerable
shift in probability from the book being dry (w6) to it being
wet (w8), as the agent moves towards an ontic mindset. One
could perhaps argue that in an ontic mindset, the agent has
access to event/transition information so as to reason about
the causes of the book getting wet: it believes that there is a
moderate to high likelihood that the book will get wet if it is
on the patio, due to the sprinkler coming on or it starting to
rain (explaining the wet-grass evidence).
The following is a list of resulting belief states b′ = b C
¬Dry(G) ∧ Dry(B) for the specified epistemic strengths.
os(·) bC ¬Dry(G) ∧ Dry(B)
0.00 〈0.00, 0.29, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.71, 0.00, 0.00〉
0.25 〈0.00, 0.33, 0.00, 0.00, 0.03, 0.59, 0.00, 0.04〉
0.50 〈0.01, 0.37, 0.00, 0.00, 0.07, 0.47, 0.01, 0.07〉
0.75 〈0.01, 0.41, 0.00, 0.01, 0.10, 0.35, 0.01, 0.11〉
1.00 〈0.02, 0.45, 0.00, 0.01, 0.14, 0.23, 0.01, 0.15〉
When the agent considers the observation completely
epistemically, its beliefs change very similarly to when it
was only told that the grass is wet; the agent already be-
lieved that the book was dry. However, the extra information
has a significant impact on how the agent’s beliefs change
when the observation is considered ontically. The agent now
believes much less that the book is outside and wet and the
grass is wet, and with 78% (as opposed to 40% with the first
observation) that the book is dry and the grass is wet (in-
dependent of where the book is located). The reason is that
when the received information includes a dry book, transi-
tions are focused on going to dry-book worlds.
Conclusion
In this paper I suggested a method to arrive at a new (proba-
bilistic) belief state when the agent has mixed feelings about
whether to revise or update its beliefs, given a new piece
of information. Much attention was given to the design and
analysis of the separate update and revision operations. The
postulates and finally Theorem 1 add weight to my argument
that the hybrid stochastic belief change (HSBC) operation is
rational when the agent has a rational frame of mind.
Looking at the examples above, the way in which proba-
bilities shift among the possible worlds, given the different
ontic/epistemic strengths, seems justifiable. However, more
analysis is required here, especially when considering more
complicated specification patterns of the ontic/epistemic
strengths.
Determining os(α,w) for every foreseen α in every pos-
sible world w will be challenging for a designer. Some
deep questions are: Should the designer/agent provide the
strengths (via stored values or programmed reasoning), or
do these strengths come to the agent attached to the new
information? What is the reasoning process we go through
to determine whether information is epistemic or ontic, if at
all? In general, how does an agent know when information
is epistemic (requiring revision) or ontic (requiring update)?
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